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INTRODUCTION 
In the fall of 2011, I spent several months at Occupy Wall Street as 
an observer, a participant in both the nightly General Assemblies and 
the Spokes Council, and as an active member of the Occupy Wall 
Street Activist Legal Working Group.  I was also part of the legal 
team that worked on drafting a brief about the status of Zuccotti Park 
as a public forum.  My reflections in this Essay are based on my 
personal experience with Occupy Wall Street, and the purpose of this 
Essay is to examine the peculiar relationship between legalism, the 
public sphere, and devolution of power that I witnessed there. The 
implications are larger and relate more generally to consensus 
organizing and legalism.  This is not intended to be an exhaustive 
study of Occupy Wall Street, but rather an Essay about the culture 
that I experienced, and so the bulk of the stories and descriptions 
come from my own experience. 
 
* Associate Professor of Law, Fordham Law School.  Thank you to the Stein Center 
and the wonderful editors at the Fordham Urban Law Journal for their patience and 
thoughtful edits. 
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What interests me is how legalistic, bureaucratic, and process-
focused the governance system at Occupy Wall Street became over 
time.  Anyone who spent much time at the park and at the almost 
nightly meetings of the “Spokes Council” (the body which became 
responsible for project funds), would be struck by how much time the 
Spokes Council spent on fairly arcane points of process, and how little 
time they spent on substantive discussions.1  For example, after a 
discussion about the amount of money available for bail for people 
arrested during protests, there was a lengthy disagreement not about 
the bail cap, but about whether or not to reopen the discussion about 
the bail cap.  The decision-making body debated the appropriate 
process to use in determining whether or not to open the debate, with 
the group responsible for running the meeting repeating the rules of 
discussion several times, and hewing closely to those rules when they 
came to what they perceived to be the best interpretation.2  It was the 
kind of debate one would imagine in a court, with many references to 
precedent; this type of discourse is not what one imagines as the 
grammar of a protest movement.  Yet rules and process were 
discussed hundreds of times in this way, when there were other 
 
 1. See Hannah Chadeayne Appel, The Ritual of General Assembly and the 
Bureaucracies of Anarchy, SOCIAL TEXT (Oct. 30, 2011), 
http://www.socialtextjournal.org/blog/2011/10/the-rituals-of-general-assembly-and-
the-bureaucracies-of-anarchy.php. 
 2. The following exchange is illustrative: 
Meeting Facilitator: “So what I’m going to do now I want to see a show of 
hands.  First do we want to reopen the discussion on the bail cap?  If you’re 
a spoke raise your sign.  Okay signs down.  So I’m going to remind that we 
work by consensus.  That’s maybe not the best way in this moment but if we 
do not want to reopen the discussion of the bail cap raise your sign high.  So 
in a straight up and down vote we might be reopening this conversation.  
That’s not how this body operates.  That’s a choice that you all make.  It’s 
up to you.  I’m just trying to move this forward.” 
Representative of Solidarity Working Group: “Can we just make this easy.  
Just reopen it and let’s move on.” 
Meeting Facilitator:  “I am going to close this.  I’m really sorry, if we want to 
work by consensus we do not have consensus on this.  I’m sorry we did not 
move through a consensus process.  I want to acknowledge that we didn’t 
take concerns and we didn’t take friendly amendments to the question of, 
‘do we want to reopen the discussion on the bail cap,’ so since we don’t have 
consensus on that we cannot, at this time, reopen the discussion on the bail 
cap.  If you want to go there as a full consensus process at the beginning of 
the next meeting then that.” 
Operational Spokes Council Minutes, #OCCUPYWALLSTREET N.Y.C. GEN. 
ASSEMBLY BETA (Nov. 25, 2011, 7:00 PM), http://www.nycga.net/2011/11/25/ 
11252011-operational-spokes-council-minutes/. 
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possible debates to be had—about strategy, for instance, or ethical 
debates about the scope of protest. 
I use the frame of legalism to explore what I witnessed.  The term 
“legalism” refers to a cultural commitment to following rules, and an 
association between morality and rule-following.3  In a legalistic 
culture, the laws are more important than the reasons for the laws, 
and rule-following is a greater virtue than being good.  At its peak—
September 2011 through November 2011—Occupy Wall Street was 
curious because it was simultaneously legalistic and anti-legalistic.  
Many of the Occupy Wall Street protesters were committed to 
unmasking ideologies, including the ideology related to the “legality” 
of certain practices, and some openly promoted civil disobedience 
against the rules of the state.  At the same time, the internal culture of 
Occupy Wall Street was a highly legalistic organizing culture, with a 
highly rigid and quasi-totemic “process” which was frequently 
referred to and discussed.  The rules of expression and rules of 
decision in the two primary decision-making bodies of Occupy Wall 
Street, the General Assembly and the Spokes Council (whose 
processes I describe in the bulk of this Essay), became the common 
grammar of the movement.  Meeting discussions tended to direct 
themselves to a discussion of rules and rule-following.  And morality 
was implicitly invoked—failure to follow the Occupy Wall Street 
“process” was sometimes seen as a violation of the community norms, 
not merely a technical failure. 
This observation is particularly interesting because the stereotype 
of devolved or “bottom-up”4 organizing is that it is chaotic and does 
not conform to a rule-following and rule-invoking culture.  One need 
only sift through the various descriptions of Occupy Wall Street to 
find a consistent strain characterizing the movement as a disorderly 
one.  In November 2011, one editorial in Bloomington called the 
Occupiers “disorganized bands.”5  A writer for a Phoenix paper said 
 
 3. JUDITH SHKLAR, LEGALISM 1 (1964). 
 4. See Josh Potter, This Is What Horizontal Democracy Looks Like, 
METROLAND, Oct. 6, 2011, http://metroland.net/2011/10/06/this-is-what-horizontal-
democracy-looks-like/ (citing an organizer talking about the “messy” nature of the 
movement which she says is “bottom up”). See generally MATT KIBBE, HOSTILE 
TAKEOVER: RESISTING CENTRALIZED GOVERNMENT’S STRANGLEHOLD ON AMERICA 
(2012) (recommending that readers “embrace the beautiful chaos of citizen action 
and, by our movement’s success, prove that freedom works,” and discussing the 
“bottom up” change that must happen). 
 5. Editorial, ‘Occupy’ Groups Missing Target with Protests, PANTAGRAPH.COM 
(Nov. 20, 2011 7:00 AM), http://pantagraph.com/news/opinion/editorial/occupy-
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that “Occupy Wall Street is so disorganized it doesn’t even appear to 
have specific leadership, or hierarchy,” explicitly associating a state of 
organization with the existence of an established hierarchy.6  Perhaps 
more interesting is the idea that is reflected in these images that 
bottom-up, grassroots decision-making is likely more disorderly.  A 
writer for Business Insider wrote last fall: 
From the beginning of time two forces have vied for influence over 
us.  One is bottoms-up, decentralized, and emergent.  The other is 
top-down, centralized, and directed.  The first force catalyzes change 
and divergence, while the second tends toward order and 
convergence.  The first gives birth to new ideas, and the second 
enshrines them.7 
The association between decentralization of power, devolution of 
power, and disorderliness and lack of rules exists elsewhere.  For 
example, Amy Cohen writes that political philosophers associate “a 
rejection of the kind of centralized legal regulation favored by liberal 
advocates of the New Deal state” with “an embrace of informal, 
flexible, lay, and even extralegal problem solving.”8  Critics of 
libertarians Dorf and Sabel, for instance, associate their project with a 
rejection of law because they place lawmaking and law-creation at a 
decentralized level.9 
I do not think there’s much doubt that Occupy Wall Street was 
highly decentralized, with power distributed at the most grass-roots 
level.10  Its apparent disorder, however, masked a high degree of rigid 
 
groups-missing-target-with-protests/article_9e166fcc-1238-11e1-ade6-
001cc4c002e0.html. 
 6. Adam Hartung, Why Occupy Wall Street Deserves More Attention than the 
Tea Party, PHOENIX PRINCIPLE (Nov. 20, 2011 7:43 PM), 
http://www.thephoenixprinciple.com/blog/2011/11/why-occupy-wall-street-is-more-
interesting-than-the-tea-party.html. 
 7. Adam Ludwin, From LOLcats to Occupy Wall Street, Everything Is 
Happening from the Bottom Up Now, SEFOSSICO (Dec. 8, 2011), 
http://www.sefossifoco.com/from-lolcats-to-occupy-wall-street-everything-is-
happening-from-the-bottom-up-now/. 
 8. Amy Cohen, Governance Legalism: Hayek and Sabel on Reason and Rules, 
Organization and Law, 2010 WIS. L. REV. 357, 357 (2010). 
 9. See, e.g., Jason M. Solomon, Law and Governance in the 21st Century 
Regulatory State, 86 TEX. L. REV. 819, 827 (2008) (describing new governance as “a 
critique of and (for some) an intentional challenge to the rights-based model of legal 
liberalism”). 
 10. Anthony DiMaggio & Paul Street, Occupy Wall Street, Mass Media and 
Progressive Change in the Tea Party Era, ECON. & POL. WKLY. (Nov. 19, 2011), 
http://www.epw.in/commentary/occupy-wall-street-mass-media-and-progressive-
change-tea-party-era.html. 
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rule-following.  Occupy Wall Street’s example suggests that the 
association of the devolved with the non-legalistic may be misplaced, 
especially if the “bottom-up” culture has a commitment to each 
member having an equal political voice.  A “bottom-up” culture 
dedicated to ensuring that people do not get marginalized—especially 
one in which consensus is the rule of decision—may lead to rules and 
rule-following and the culture of legalism that accompany that 
devolution.  The actual experience of Occupy Wall Street poses a 
challenge to theorists who celebrate the Habermasian ideal of a 
public forum, or deliberative democrats who idealize political fora in 
which there is universally recognized political equality and a right to 
speak and engage.  It doesn’t undermine their basic moral claim (that 
such a sphere politically and morally justifies its legitimacy), but it 
suggests that at least in some instances, a public sphere in which 
everyone has an equal voice may be a highly legalistic one. 
Habermas developed the ideal of a communicative sphere in which 
there would be critical discussion leading to consensus around 
matters of common concern.11  The deliberative democratic political 
theorists, likewise, are proponents of radical political equality and the 
possibility of consensus.12  Like Habermas, deliberative democratic 
theorists argue that political legitimacy derives from open rational 
discussion in which speakers are presumed to have political equality.  
Occupy Wall Street was an extraordinary experiment in the public 
sphere ideal and deliberative democracy, and it suggests that while 
such processes might work, the pathologies of legalism may appear to 
threaten the process.  Political equality and consensus norms may—
not must but may—lead to rule-based communicative culture instead 
of a public morality.   
 I want to frame the discussion of Occupy Wall Street within two 
mid-century critiques of popular culture.  The first is Judith Shklar’s 
critique of the culture of legalism.13  The second is Jürgen Habermas’s 
critique of rationalized, commercialized, and feudalized public 
discourse.14  What I find so interesting is that a movement that almost 
 
 11. See James Bohman & William Rehg, Jürgen Habermas, in STANFORD 
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF POLITICAL PHILOSOPHY (2011), available at 
http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/habermas/. 
 12. See generally JON ELSTER, DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY (1998) (outlining the 
basic shared principles of deliberative democratic theorists). 
 13. SHKLAR, supra note 3, at 1–20. 
 14. 1 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 350–70 
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1989).  To be fair, Habermas’ idea of “consensus” is not 
necessarily actual political consensus achieved through deliberation coming to 
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precisely matches Habermas’s essential elements would end up 
having so many of the features of legalism that Shklar critiques, and 
some echoes of the “juridification” that Habermas critiques.15  In Part 
I, I briefly describe the rules and communicative culture of Occupy 
Wall Street and the legalism that I witnessed there.  In Part II, I 
introduce the idea of legalism and the idea of the public sphere.  In 
Part III, I provide several tentative hypotheses explaining the 
existence of legalism at Occupy Wall Street. 
I.  PROCESS AT OCCUPY WALL STREET 
Within the media, Occupy Wall Street was often associated with 
disorder, chaos, and a lack of structure.  Occupy Wall Street was 
often described in terms of its spontaneity and amorphousness.  Some 
critics called the encampment “amorphous” and “leaderless” and 
described it in terms of the lack of a clear vision or set of demands.16  
The language of press articles often suggested an absence of process.  
While Occupy Wall Street was leaderless, however, it was not without 
structure.  People could just show up and speak, but in order to speak 
they had to abide by a strict set of rules of engagement.  They could 
only speak by signing up on a “stack,” only speak on the topics that 
were on the agenda, only speak for two minutes, and only speak 
about the agenda items in a highly constrained set of ways.  They 
could not introduce a new proposal, for instance, without having 
previously gone through a committee that would allow them to 
introduce a proposal.  They could only speak to whether or not they 
supported a proposal during one specified time period; at other times 
they could ask clarifying questions about a proposal or provide 
amendments.  In short, Occupy Wall Street was governed by a fairly 
formal set of communication rules. 
It was also governed by a formal set of structures, divided into 
three primary groups.  The core political decision-making body was 
 
agreement, but the mental, emotional, political and moral consensus of those who 
have been through the process. See also JÜRGEN HABERMAS, MORAL 
CONSCIOUSNESS AND COMMUNICATIVE ACTION (1990) (responding to the skeptical 
approach to the possibility of consensus). 
 15. 1 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 350–70 
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1989) (discussing the “juridification” of the “lifeworld” 
through bureaucratic processes). 
 16. Ruth Davis Konigsberg, People Who Live in Glass, Fixed-Rate Mortgage 
Houses Shouldn’t Throw Stones at Occupy Wall Street, TIME (Nov. 1, 2011), 
http://ideas.time.com/2011/11/01/people-who-live-in-glass-fixed-rate-mortgaged-
houses/ (citing accusations of “the encampment” being amorphous). 
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the General Assembly.17  The General Assembly was the only body 
that could make strategy decisions, and for the first six weeks it was 
the only body that could allocate funds.  The secondary political 
decision-making body was the Spokes Council, which was introduced 
in late October.  The third set of decision-makers was comprised of 
the fifty to one hundred “working groups” of different sizes that met 
and had their own purposes.  Most of the working groups followed 
the same discussion structure that the General Assembly established.  
Working groups were responsible for sanitation in Zuccotti Park, for 
planning protest actions, providing music and culture, for planning an 
alternative banking system, for running a free outdoor library, and for 
running a kitchen which provided food three times a day. 
The General Assemblies were held outside in Zuccotti Park and 
anyone could attend and participate.  General Assemblies had to 
follow this set of processes: anything on the agenda, unless it was an 
emergency, had to be submitted to the Facilitation working group and 
posted on the Occupy Wall Street website for at least twenty-four 
hours prior to a decision.  At the General Assembly, the following 
agenda was followed every night: First, the rules of engagement were 
reiterated.  Second, working groups would report about their 
activities.  Third, proposals would be presented.  After being 
presented, there would be a time for asking questions and 
clarifications, a time for discussion, a time for friendly amendments, 
and then the facilitators would “test for consensus.” 
All of these bodies used the same communication signals to make 
decisions.  If someone spoke up in a way that the members of the 
general assembly supported, those members who supported the 
response would raise their fingers in the air and flutter them, with the 
fingers pointing sky-ward.  If members of the assembly disagreed with 
the statement, they would raise hands in the air, point the fingers 
downward, and flutter their fingers. 
 
 17. All of the following rules and practices come from my own observations.  For 
a few other good sources for these practices, see Carolina, Quick Guide on Group 
Dynamics in People’s Assemblies, TAKE THE SQUARE (July 31, 2011), 
http://takethesquare.net/2011/07/31/quick-guide-on-group-dynamics-in-peoples-
assemblies/; Neal Gorenflo, Occupy Wall Street’s Consensus Process [VIDEO], 
SHAREABLE: CIVICSYSTEM (Oct. 14, 2011, 6:29 PM), 
http://www.shareable.net/blog/occupy-wall-streets-consensus-process-video; About, 
#OCCUPYWALLSTREET N.Y.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY BETA, 
http://www.nycga.net/about/ (last visited December 20, 2012); Ekai, Consensus 
Decision-Making Hand Signals Explained at #OccupySF, YOUTUBE (Oct. 8, 2011), 
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=R2yYiULZ0hA. 
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If a participant had a question they needed to clarify they would 
raise their hands and create a “C” like shape with their fingers.  If 
they had a point of information that would add factual depth to the 
discussion, they would raise a single finger.  If, during the decision-
making process, they believed that a particular motion could pose a 
threat to the safety or integrity of the community to such a degree 
that if it passed, it would cause them to think about leaving the 
movement, they would cross their hands in front of their chests and 
create a “block.”  After making a block, the would-be blockers would 
have a chance to express the reason for their block and any material 
things that could change in the proposal that would make them 
rethink the block.  
The facilitators would measure consensus through something called 
“temperature checks.”  In a temperature check, the facilitators would 
ask the assembly to either wave their fingers towards the sky or 
towards the ground, to get a sense of how close the assembly was to 
consensus.  The proposer, upon seeing that there was not anything 
approaching consensus, could then choose to drop or table the 
proposal or demand that the facilitators take another official 
consensus check. 
In order to speak, individuals had to get their names on a list 
called the “stack” and wait to express their support or concern 
regarding the proposal at hand.  There was a strict two-minute time 
limit.  If someone went over the time limit, the facilitator would 
indicate that they had to stop both by telling the individual to stop 
and also by using physical gestures.  If someone violated the process 
and continued to speak, openly disrespecting the rules, the facilitator 
would loudly say “Mic Check.”  The audience then would repeat 
“Mic Check” loudly to drown out the voice of the participant who 
was continuing to speak, and then would announce the name of the 
next person on “stack.”  The same “Mic Check” procedure would be 
used to regain control if someone did not follow process and spoke 
loudly during the meetings. 
This General Assembly model operated for several months with 
relatively little variation.  The number of people who attended 
General Assembly grew and then dwindled.  There were many 
frustrations with the slowness of the General Assembly process and 
the ease with which participants could block proposals, but during the 
peak period the basic rules remained fairly stable. 
The General Assemblies were run by a group of people known as 
facilitators, who were selected by a working group called the 
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Facilitation Working Group to run the meetings.  Anyone could join 
the Facilitation Working Group, which, as per the rules of the 
Occupation, was required to post its meeting times publicly online 
and to be open to new members.  The facilitators were responsible for 
managing conversations and decisions and deciding when the 
assembly had sufficient support to promote or oppose a decision.  A 
proposal that was presented less than twenty-four hours prior to a 
general assembly would be rejected unless the Facilitation Working 
Group agreed that the proposal was an emergency proposal.  From 
discussions with members of the Facilitation Working Group, I gather 
that the Facilitation Working Group largely saw itself as being 
constrained by the rules of the process, and did not imagine that it 
had substantial leeway to structure the order of discussion or the 
proposals that were to be discussed.18 
The rules of discussion and decision-making were laid out at the 
beginning of each General Assembly. This process often took five to 
fifteen minutes.  The laying out of the rules appeared to have two 
social functions: first, it introduced new attendees to the appropriate 
way to engage in the discussion; and second, it reinforced the rules of 
engagement for attendees who had been there before.  The repeated 
invocation of the rules came to be expected as part of the process of 
each new meeting. 
After the facilitators laid out the rules of engagement, they would 
introduce a set of proposals to the group.  After the introduction of 
any given proposal, the Assembly would have an opportunity to ask 
questions about the proposal, then an opportunity to propose 
amendments to the proposal.  Finally, they would have a chance to 
talk about the substance of the proposal and then choose whether or 
not to pass the proposal.  Instead of calling for a vote, the facilitators 
would call for “temperature taking” and “moving towards 
consensus.”  The terminology was designed by some to be a rejection 
of the language of voting and representation.  When people brought 
up the word “vote,” it would almost always be quickly rejected or 
replaced.  During the discussion, the general assembly would create 
constant feedback to the topic being discussed and the responses to 
the topic.  Responses were subject to time limits.  
 
 18.  This may have been even more important because of the regular accusations 
that the Facilitation Working Group was abusing its power, which arguably led to the 
Facilitation Working Group being very sensitive to its own use of power and 
discretion. 
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A. The Spokes Council 
The Spokes Council was created through consensus at the General 
Assembly.19  It emerged in response to concerns about the inefficiency 
of dealing with financial matters through the General Assembly, 
leading to a radical slow-down in the workings of Occupy Wall 
Street.20  During the debate about its creation, the example was used 
of a lengthy discussion about obtaining $300 of funding for sanitation 
trucks.  The argument was that there was already consensus among 
the most active members, and so the need for going through the 
General Assembly’s extensive process was trivial.21  Moreover, there 
was an expression of a desire to have the General Assembly operate 
more like a discussion forum for philosophical questions about the 
nature of financial institutions and the future of the global economy.  
From speaking to some of the people who supported the Spokes 
Council, however, I gathered that another reason for the shift to the 
Spokes Council was a desire for a body of “true” activists to manage 
the process. 
The Spokes Council had the same rules for deliberating and 
speaking as the General Assembly, and it maintained the same ninety 
percent consensus voting rule, but a different category for who could 
speak and who could participate in decision-making.22  Rather than 
allowing all people to speak, the Spokes Council only allowed an 
individuals to speak if they were “spokes” of a working group.23  In 
that role, they were supposed to reflect the views of the working 
group, not only their own views.24  Those who were present but not 
part of any working group could not speak.  Spokes Council meetings 
 
 19.  See Consensus in Large Groups, SEEDS FOR CHANGE, 
http://files.uniteddiversity.com/Decision_Making_and_Democracy/Consensus/Conse
nsus_in_Large_Groups.pdf (last visited Oct. 26, 2012); Spokes Council Proposal, 
#OCCUPYWALLSTREET N.Y.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY BETA, http://www.nycga.net/spokes-
council/ (last visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
 20. See Draft Proposal for Fri 10/28 General Assembly: Structure, 
#OCCUPYWALLSTREET N.Y.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY BETA, (Oct. 27, 2011), 
http://www.nycga.net/2011/10/27/draft-proposal-for-fri-1028-general-assembly-
structure/. 
 21. Rosie Gray, Occupy Wall Street Debuts the New Spokes Council, VILLAGE 
VOICE (Nov. 8, 2011, 10:12 AM), http://blogs.villagevoice.com/runninscared/ 
2011/11/occupy_wall_str_25.php; Harry Siegel, TWITTER (Oct. 28, 2011, 7:10 PM), 
https://twitter.com/harrysiegel/status/130104199949193216. 
 22. See Liberty Square Adopts a Spokes Council, OCCUPY WALL STREET (Nov. 3, 
2011), http://occupywallst.org/article/occupy-wall-street-adopts-spokes-council/. 
 23. Id. 
 24. Id. 
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were also run by members of the Facilitation Working Group, and 
often began with a meditation upon the “agreements” that the 
community had coming together.  The basic community agreements 
were to listen and not interrupt, to consider “Why am I talking?” 
(WAIT), to stay on process, to be respectful, to refrain from shouting 
people down, to rotate spokes, to abstain from name-calling, and to 
agree that only spokes were allowed to speak to the full group.25 
The representatives of the various working groups then would 
debate the content as the Spokes Council.  These meetings were 
typically held indoors, at least three evenings each week.26  In order to 
enable the people speaking to be heard, and because there was 
limited space, groups did not tend to socialize with other groups but 
instead sat with their own Working Group Members.  The fact of a 
ninety percent decision rule created an extremely high barrier for the 
passage of proposals.  The Spokes Council had a slightly different 
tone than the General Assembly.  It tended to be far more 
contentious, which led to the facilitators often using the language of 
mediation and reiterating the joint nature of the enterprise.  The 
emotional, personal, or informal language created a strange 
disconnect between the formality of the process and the informality 
and open emotionality of the facilitators.  Often, the conversation and 
discussion fell apart because of disagreements about process.27 
II.  LEGALISM AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE 
The concept of legalism derives from Judith Shklar’s 1964 book of 
the same name.28  In Legalism, Shklar argued that there is an ideology 
within the legal community that relates rule-following to morality.29  
Legalism, she claimed, is “the ethical attitude that holds moral 
conduct to be a matter of rule following, and moral relationships to 
consist of duties and rights determined by rules.”30  Legalism exists 
within the legal community, but also to a greater and lesser degree in 
other institutions.  Shklar, who was very critical of this legalism, saw it 
as an obscuring force that separated legal institutions from the 
 
 25. Id. 
 26. Id. 
 27. See Archive for Spokes Council Minutes, #OCCUPYWALLSTREET N.Y.C. 
GEN. ASSEMBLY BETA, http://www.nycga.net/category/assemblies/minutes-sc/ (last 
visited Oct. 26, 2012). 
 28. SHKLAR, supra note 3. 
 29. Id. at 1. 
 30. Id. 
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context in which they arose.31  Legalism provides a cohering culture 
but also separates rules from politics.32  A cultural fixation on rules 
obscures and transforms fundamental moral questions and replaces 
them with technical questions. 
In a legalistic culture, the overlay of rule-following and morality 
leads to a cultural tendency to think and talk about rules (instead of 
morality), to judge on the basis of rule-following (instead of 
morality), and to self-judge on the basis of rule-following (instead of 
goodness or virtue).33  The process of rule-following tends to become 
as important as the particular substantive harms that the rules 
protect.  In short, the culture becomes one of “process over 
substance.”  Legalistic cultures transform substantive debates into 
procedural debates.  In a culture dominated by legalism, the rules 
themselves and the relationships between the rules and individuals 
and institutions dominate the conversations, becoming the topic of 
ultimate concern and the set of ideas around which debates are 
framed. 
As Shklar described it: 
The urge to draw a clear line between law and non-law has led to the 
constructing of ever more refined and rigid systems of formal 
definitions.  This procedure has served to isolate law completely 
from the social context within which it exists.  Law is endowed with 
its own discrete, integral history, its own “science,” and its own 
values, which are all treated as a single “block” sealed off from 
general social history, from general social theory, from politics, and 
from morality.  The habits of mind appropriate, within narrow 
limits, to the procedures of law courts in the most stable legal 
systems have been expanded to provide legal theory and ideology 
with an entire system of thought and values.34 
In a legalistic culture, once the rules exist they quickly grow to take 
on a separate power of their own, so that this formalism takes over, 
and leads to what Shklar perceives to be a disturbing reverence for 
the laws.  This is because, as Robin West explained: “if one has a 
moral duty to obey rules, it must be the case that the rules are there—
and accordingly, legalism commits lawyers to the formalist claim . . . 
that existing law fully determines all questions posed by conflicting 
 
 31. Id. 
 32. Id. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 2. 
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rights and duties.”35  Another feature of legalism is the (related) 
tendency to conservatism, because all rules that are right-creating 
must necessarily come before the current moment or debate.36  If 
actions are judged in terms of their conformity to rules and process—
without regard to their substance—how can one then change the rules 
or introduce new ones?  Legalism enshrines—and values—laws 
because they are there and have been there before, and thereby 
creates a culture. 
But how is one to tell the difference between a legalistic culture 
and a non-legalistic culture?  All cultures have rules and different 
degrees of rule-breaking, but it is the attention to those rules—and 
the moral judgment that accompanies the following or breaking of 
rules—that defines legalism.  One can have a non-legalistic culture 
with many rules, or a legalistic culture with few rules; it is the 
relationship to the rules of the individuals as they interact with each 
other inside the institution that matters.  Take, for instance, jay-
walking, a town “rule” against walking across a street in an area other 
than the designated crosswalk.  The fact that the rule exists tells you 
nothing about whether the town culture is legalistic or not.  In fact, a 
rule on the books tells you very little: it merely tells you that there is a 
rule, not whether anyone takes it seriously.  Nor does merely 
watching whether people violate the rule: rule-following and legalism 
may tend to be, but are not necessarily, correlated.  Person A might 
follow the rule and not jaywalk, but not because she has a particularly 
moral, character-based relationship to rules in general.  Instead, she 
might be afraid of getting caught.  Person B might have a strong habit 
of only walking on crosswalks and will obey that habit without much 
thought.  Person C might choose to obey the rule because of concerns 
about safety.  Person D might obey the rule, however, because he 
believes that rules should be followed because they are rules, and he 
gains a greater and more positive sense of identity when he follows 
rules; person D when privately or publicly mentioning those who 
jaywalk will use language that indicates that law-breakers are 
somehow violating the cultural norms, and are “wrong” simply for 
failing to follow the rules.  Person D therefore represents the 
“legalistic” approach to rule following. 
When it comes to institutions, there are greater and lesser degrees 
of legalism, and individuals who are not legalistic in other parts of 
 
 35. Robin West, Reconsidering Legalism, 88 MINN. L. REV. 119, 120 (2003). 
 36. Id. 
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their lives may take on a legalistic attitude when in a legalistic 
institution.  A non-legalistic institutional culture will not spend most 
of its time and energy debating the rules of procedure or referring to 
the rules of procedure.  If a procedural rule is violated in a non-
legalistic institution, the violation is likely to go unnoticed; most 
participants may not even know the rules.  For example, in my 
experience, some boards of small non-profits may not follow those 
rules that govern them and may not even know the rules.  They may, 
for example, recruit a new board member without referencing a rule 
that new board members may only join every three years.  If the rule 
is brought to the board’s attention, they may choose to follow it, but 
the infraction is not seen as a fundamental—or moral—infraction.  
Other institutions of governance may be non-legalistic in other ways.  
For example, one could argue that many representative bodies, while 
rule-following, are not legalistic, in that they do not attach a separate 
moral value to rule-following.  They follow the rules because if they 
did not they would be “caught” and punished by those of an opposing 
party.  They do not, however, internalize the rules as essentially good. 
For Shklar, and the conversations that have followed, the debate 
about legalism began in the international justice sphere—Shklar 
stands for a generous skepticism towards a “rule of law” approach in 
the context of war crimes, in particular, in wake of World War II.37  
My interest is in applying this critique at the opposite end of the 
scale—legalism in the context of movements and community 
organizing, and most particularly legalism in the context of a 
movement built around civil disobedience.  Legalism is particularly 
interesting for Occupy Wall Street because by its own terms, legalism 
rejects liberalism, which is often deeply associated with Occupy Wall 
Street. 
Shklar, of course, has many bedfellows in her critique.  Lon Fuller 
was disturbed by what he saw as a “creeping legalism” that changed 
all rhetorical and communicative spheres to adjudicative discussions.38  
For still others, legalism is the perversion of the rule of law, when 
rules become fetishized over substance, as opposed to enablers of 
substantive virtues.39  One critic discusses how legalism makes a 
“fetish of rules” and “shuts out moral, political, and social 
 
 37. See generally SHKLAR, supra note 3. 
 38. LOU FULLER, Two Principles of Human Association, in THE PRINCIPLES OF 
SOCIAL ORDER 81 (Kenneth Winston ed., 2001). 
 39. See West, supra note 35, at 119. 
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discourse.”40  Legalism “takes on the trappings of a kind of overall 
regulator in that it assures us of a single authoritative rule for each 
dispute as well as an internally consistent system of rules.”41 
Legalism is not always used in a negative light.  The notion of 
“legal liberalism” is intertwined with pluralism, and one of the values 
of legalism is the importance of a shared grammar in a multicultural 
context.  Robert Gordon, for instance, writes about the value of a 
professional culture with autonomous rules: “The culture of legalism 
may help to promote political pluralism because it can multiply 
procedures, rule-following temperaments, and entrenched 
professional practices that are askew to or somewhat resistant to 
outside control and manipulation.”42 
The political philosopher Jürgen Habermas clearly identifies with 
the kind of argument that Shklar makes—he argues against what he 
sees as a tendency for the rational, juridical mode of argumentation 
that descends from rationalized feudalism entering into and 
colonizing family and educational life.43  His critique is largely one of 
“instrumental reason” instead of public discourse.44  Habermas is 
interested in the relationship of the public-to-public conversation, and 
the relationship between public conversation and political 
legitimacy.45  He is committed to the possibility of a legitimate public 
discourse that is measured by something other than just rationality; 
he is opposed to the profusion of hierarchical, end-of-history rules 
that accompany an overly rational culture.46  He associates rationality 
(without public discourse) as an expression of hierarchical power. 
Instead, he advocates for communicative rationality, whereby 
perpetual reason-giving directly empowers the public to identify and 
create legitimate reasons.47  In his idealized form, the discussions 
consisted of reasoned and represented individuals speaking to each 
 
 40. James Elkins, Thinking Like a Lawyer: Second Thoughts, 47 MERCER L. REV. 
511, 529 (1996). 
 41. Id. at 529–30. 
 42. Robert Gordon, The Role of Lawyers in Producing the Rule of Law: Some 
Critical Reflections, 11 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 441, 458 (2010). 
 43. See generally JÜRGEN HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS: 
CONTRIBUTIONS TO A DISCOURSE THEORY OF LAW AND DEMOCRACY (William Rehg 
trans., 1996). 
 44. 1 JÜRGEN HABERMAS, THE THEORY OF COMMUNICATIVE ACTION 356–73 
(Thomas McCarthy trans., 1989). 
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. 
 47. Id. 
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other on behalf of the public, not on behalf of themselves.  When 
mass media became the dominant form of public and political 
interaction, however, citizens became consumers instead of public-
speaking participants and the public sphere became “refeudalized.”48 
Habermas argues that in order to free the public sphere—that is, to 
recreate the possibility of legitimate decision-making coming out of 
the public sphere—there is a need for engaged activist groups to 
create the culture of the public sphere.49  Much of Habermas’ writing 
centers around and derives from this history and this ideal discourse 
situation.  Habermas’ political ideals are focused on “communicative 
action” and discourse.50  When engaged in communicative action, 
participants come together in order to reach a common view.51  They 
use argument and cooperation in an effort to reach consensus and 
seek collective ends instead of individual ends.52  In Habermas’s view, 
one must engage in reason-giving from the perspective of the 
communal society, and the act of reason-giving must both reflect and 
create intersubjectivity.53 
For Habermas, process is justice, but juridification is a kind of 
social and political death: “In the vertigo of this freedom there is no 
longer any fixed point outside the democratic procedure itself—a 
procedure whose meaning is already summed up in the system of 
rights.”54  Habermas’ theory is that ideas are legitimated by coming 
through and being created by the process of open and rational 
discussions resulting in consensus.  At the same time, the open 
process should not be too formalized.  An essential part of this 
idealized discourse is that when speaking, the speakers speak from 
the perspective of the civil society itself, not from the perspective of 
their own interests; arguably, this is the perspective of the public 
sphere.55  Therefore, in the idealized discourse, free speakers give 
reasons for action from a public perspective, and other free speakers 
counter those reasons.56  While the idealized form may never exist, 
the public sphere can exist when there are public discussions that are 
 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. at 84. 
 52. Id. 
 53. HABERMAS, BETWEEN FACTS AND NORMS, supra note 43, at 280. 
 54. Id. at 229. 
 55. Id. 
 56. Id. 
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not dominated by individual perspective.  In this sense, the public 
sphere is easiest to imagine in direct opposition to a view of the public 
sphere as a space for negotiating between clashing private interests.57  
According to Habermas, a functioning public sphere leads to a 
general recognition of overlapping public consensus.  The core 
principles that shaped the process are very similar to the core 
principles that Habermas considered necessary for a public sphere—
open access, open discussion, a starting point of the public as the 
orientation, a commitment to political equality and (at least within 
the movement) a free press.  Habermas said that communicative 
action existed when two or more people “seek to reach an 
understanding about the action situation and their plans of action in 
order to coordinate their actions by way of agreement. The central 
concept of interpretation refers in the first instance to negotiating 
definitions of the situation which admit of consensus.”58 
III.  EXPLANATIONS FOR LEGALISM AT OCCUPY WALL STREET 
At Occupy Wall Street, the language with which people described 
their own communicative culture was reminiscent of both Habermas 
and the Deliberative Democratic theorists.59  One of the lead 
organizers called the model of consensus process “the movement’s 
greatest achievement.”60  It was to be a model of “genuine, direct 
democracy to counterpose the corrupt charade presented to us as 
‘democracy’ by the U.S. Government.”61  The idea that people would 
come to an understanding and a shared plan of action based on 
 
 57. In other words, this view of the public sphere is in direct contrast to the 
fundamental underpinnings of social choice theory and much of law and economics 
scholarship. 
 58. Jürgen Habermas, Social Action and Rationality, in JÜRGEN HABERMAS ON 
SOCIETY AND POLITICS: A READER 142, 143 (Steven Seidman ed., 1989). 
 59. One of those theorists, Michael Dorf, concluded that the Occupy Movement 
was less interested in protest than in process. See Michael Dorf, Occupy Wall Street 
Is a Democracy Movement, DORF ON LAW (Oct. 31, 2011), http://www.dorfonlaw.org/ 
2011/10/occupy-wall-street-is-democracy.html.  Dorf and Sabel did not, unlike the 
other theorists, encourage or require consensus in their model of democratic 
experimentalism. See Michael Dorf & Charles Sabel, A Constitution of Democratic 
Experimentalism, 98 COLUM. L. REV. 267 (1998). 
 60. David Graeber, David Graeber: On Playing by the Rules—The Strange 
Success of #OccupyWallStreet, NAKED CAPITALISM (Oct. 19, 2011), 
http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/10/david-graeber-on-playing-by-the-rules-
%E2%80%93-the-strange-success-of-occupy-wall-street.html. 
 61. Id. 
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consensus was not secondary, but primary.  For example, Dan 
Kervick, a member of Occupy Wall Street, wrote: 
It is notable and inspiring that as the Occupy Wall Street movement 
took shape around the United States and other parts of the world, 
the participants in the occupations organized themselves as 
communities of equals, in which every voice is equally prized and 
harmonious consensus is avidly sought.  The hunger for democratic 
community and self-determination is palpable.  This is not the 
laissez faire form of self-determination, in which each individual 
strives only to determine the course of one individual life, but a 
more encompassing phenomenon, in which people strive to build 
and sustain communities and then work together as equals in order 
to make well-founded, democratic decisions to determine the 
direction of the community.  It’s hard work.  But the work is 
inspiring and ennobling, and people are naturally drawn to it.62 
The language suggests people coming together.  And yet, in my 
experience with Occupy Wall Street, I discovered a highly legalistic 
culture, one in which the procedural rules became central to the 
discussions and debates and, to some degree, overtook substantive 
discussions.  Since I was also a member of a law school faculty, I 
compared the faculty meetings to the Occupy Wall Street meetings, 
and found the faculty meetings far less legalistic, if measured in 
Shklar’s terms—there was less debate about whether the meeting 
itself was following its own convening rules.  This does not undermine 
Kerviks’s point, which is well taken, or the aspirations of the 
Occupiers—I share many of the aspirations mentioned here. 
At both the Spokes Council and the General Assembly—though 
slightly more frequently at the Spokes Council—the process became a 
central point of discussion, as facilitators increasingly referred to the 
process and followed the process.  I overheard one participant talk 
about it as the “totemic process.” The legalism of the Spokes culture 
showed itself in the degree to which participants adhered to the 
process, and the anxiety and focus they exhibited toward the 
appropriateness of process. 
The effort to elevate the process seemed deliberate and essential to 
the process itself.  At the beginning of almost every meeting, there 
 
 62. Dan Kervick, Public Money for Public Purpose: Toward the End of 
Plutocracy and the Triumph of Democracy—Part V, NAKED CAPITALISM (Dec. 29, 
2011), http://www.nakedcapitalism.com/2011/12/public-money-for-public-purpose-
toward-the-end-of-plutocracy-and-the-triumph-of-democracy-part-v.html (cross 
posted on NEW ECONOMIC PERSPECTIVES). 
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would be a call to respect each other and to respect the process.63  The 
Facilitation Working Group would refer decisions about the process 
to the process rules.  This highly rigid rule-following in terms of 
process is especially striking because there is no law that backs up 
these rules (no one could sue), it is a relatively small decision-making 
body (fewer than fifty representative “spokes” were present at every 
meeting), and it is easy to imagine that decisions could have been 
made outside this process.  A minority of participants would 
sometimes act out and demand that the process be abandoned.  A 
member of the Technology working group claimed, for instance, in a 
late November meeting: “Let me explain how shit gets done right 
now.  We, the privileged elite.  I know someone’s phone number.  I 
call them.  It gets shit done.  It’s not transparent. . . . [I have] been 
with this since August just please we can assume good faith of each 
other.”64  His frustration was with the idea that process was being 
used to cause what he saw as friction instead of enabling action: “Ok, 
we agreed to stay on process but there are some times when the 
process does not serve the work that needs to be done.”65 
What is much harder to record—and is more impressionistic—is 
my experience that the language of process then bled into individual, 
unrecorded conversations, and became much of what was talked 
about within private discussions and meetings.  I also found myself 
focused on whether or not the process was being followed, and 
becoming emotionally attached to process-following for its own sake.  
I think my experience was fairly common.  People would question 
whether a particular working group was conforming to procedure—
often because they had some other substantive concern about the 
working group, but also because the culture lent itself to critiquing 
the working groups through a critique of process.  For example, a 
classic critique of my own working group was that it was not “open” 
enough.  This critique might be expressed by saying that the group 
failed to follow the rules about recording minutes of our meetings on 
the website, as required by working group rules. 
 
 63. See, e.g., Interview by 99GetSmart with Azzah from Occupy Orlando (Nov. 2, 
2011), available at http://99getsmart.com/?p=702 (discussing the importance of 
process). 
 64. NYC Operational Spokes Council Minutes 11/28/2011, 
#OCCUPYWALLSTREET N.Y.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY BETA (Nov. 28, 2011), 
http://www.nycga.net/2011/11/28/nyc-operational-spokes-council-11282011/. 
 65. Id. 
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 In the following section, I explore some hypotheses for why 
Occupy Wall Street might have become so heavily process-focused.  
A. Heterogeneity of Occupy Wall Street 
The first explanation for Occupy Wall Street’s focus on process is 
the movement’s heterogeneity.  Because Occupy Wall Street was an 
organization founded on highly diverse political beliefs, the need for a 
shared set of beliefs to organize decision-making became incredibly 
important.  Perhaps one of the most important roles of the legalism of 
the process was that it allowed the participants to create a shared 
language very quickly that was not substantive (and therefore likely 
to lead to conflict), not trivial (because it permeated the culture), and 
unique (therefore allowing for identity creation and a sense of 
separateness).  Much of the Occupy Wall Street humor related to this 
new grammar, but the grammar that spread the farthest was the legal, 
process grammar, moving far more quickly than new turns of phrases 
or new chants.  Why was this?  The legal process grammar became 
essential for communication across different substantive 
commitments. 
Mary Ann Glendon has argued that a more heterogenous society 
requires more legalism as a social bond, because the rules (and not 
the substantive commitments) are the only shared commitments.66  
This legalization of popular culture is both cause and consequence 
of our increasing tendency to look to law as an expression of the few 
values that are widely shared in our society: liberty, equality, and the 
ideal of justice under law. . . .  Legality, to a great extent, has 
become a touchstone for legitimacy.67  
Laws that engender loyalty are treated as special and sacred, not 
merely ugly necessities..  One sees this regularly in the emotional and 
intimate relationship people have to the Constitution, whether or not 
they are implicated in Constitutional decisions—the idea that gun 
ownership is a Second Amendment right is reason in and of itself to 
support gun ownership for many, whether or not they have any 
attachments to guns and even if they think gun ownership might be a 
social bad.  The Constitution’s emotional role provides a kind of glue, 
a constitutional nationalism. 
 
 66. MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGHTS TALK: THE IMPOVERISHMENT OF POLITICAL 
DISCOURSE 2 (1991). 
 67. Id. 
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B. Shared Culture of Occupy Wall Street 
Another related explanation for the legalism could be the explicit 
efforts to create community through creating a shared culture. The 
facilitator on November 14th, for example, referred to the shared 
community values in this way:  
We prefer people use “I” statements, phrase it more, “I feel this is 
going . . .” instead of, “You are a terrible . . . .”  Keep it open, 
address the entire assembly.  Keep it from your viewpoint, away 
from me versus you . . . .  Be concise and be civil.  Thank you all.  
We’re building a community.  This is a practice.  I want to review 
real quick: don’t talk over each other, respect each other’s voices, 
mutual respect.68  
The rules and laws were not so much about the laws themselves, but 
about the creation of a subculture with shared rules and laws. 
In this way, the hand signals served less as a method of decision-
making and more as the creation of the kind of allegiance that is often 
seen in secret societies or other close communities.  The use of the 
hand signals was not, in this view, a highly rigid expression of process.  
Instead, it marked a choice by those who used the signals to identify 
with a particular subculture, and in so doing severed their connections 
to other cultures.  The social function of the rules was more about 
ritual than rule itself. 
This rule-as-ritual explanation can help make sense of the high 
degree of emotional attachment to the rules that existed even among 
those who were critical of the rules.  And the rule-as-signal can 
explain how the rules would spread to different communities—such 
as some of the lawyers groups I was working with—as those similar 
communities would use the hand-signals as a gesture of solidarity or 
“getting it,” or social acceptance. Legalism, as a matter of political 
culture, and anarchism, are often understood as opposites.  In her 
book Another Liberalism, Nancy Rosenblaum writes about the 
fundamental temperamental opposition between liberal legalism and 
romantic anarchism.69  According to Rosenblaum, romantic anarchy 
opposes not just the civil law, but the “attendant ethos of fairness and 
impartiality, and the disposition to make and obey rules.”70  She 
 
 68. NYC Operational Spokes Council Minutes 11/14/2011, 
#OCCUPYWALLSTREET N.Y.C. GEN. ASSEMBLY BETA (Nov. 14, 2011), 
http://www.nycga.net/2011/11/14/nyc-operational-spokes-council-minutes-11142011/. 
 69. NANCY ROSENBLUM, ANOTHER LIBERALISM: ROMANTICISM AND THE 
RECONSTRUCTION OF LIBERAL THOUGHT 34 (1987). 
 70. Id. 
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argues that the sensibility of the anarchist is fundamentally against 
the sensibility of the state, and that “legalism is anathema in any 
department of life, not just the juridical state.”71  Anarchists find a 
political society made up of “claims and counterclaims” intolerable.72  
On the other end, she sees liberalism as a rejection of the “law of the 
heart,” a society which prefers emotional versus rational decision-
making.73  She talks about the virtues of liberalism as including an 
“active disposition” to respect rights and rules and argues that 
liberalism “assumes personalities for whom making and following 
laws feels comfortable, as well as practical and just.”74 
Relatedly, in a recent article, Amy Cohen noted that most 
contemporary scholars see “new governance” as a “break from liberal 
law.”75  Cohen notes that new governance has been seen as an 
“undermining of law,” a “move away from law-centered 
strategies,” and “informality, soft law, and extra-legal forms in 
action.”76  But Cohen very smartly notes that “when read against 
Hayekian neoliberalism, new governance emerges as a formalizing, 
reason-seeking, and indeed law-seeking project; that is, as a 
deliberate (but democratic) effort to try one’s absolute best to decide 
which principles govern and then apply them.”77  Power that is truly 
decentralized in a radically equal way requires the kind of high 
formalism and legalism that decentralized, public sphere discourse 
allegedly rejects.  
 Consider the practical difficulties that attend giving each person an 
equal power to speak.  For a three-hour meeting, if each person in a 
group of sixty is to have equal time to speak, they will each get to 
speak for three minutes total—even for the most fluent person, it is 
difficult to explore complex ideas within three minutes.  Even if only 
one in three actually wants to speak (and one might wonder the 
reasons for their shyness), a three-hour meeting would enable a total 
of nine minutes each, on all the different topics that arise.  Nine 
minutes might fairly be enough for any one person to explore and 
express their thoughts on any single issue.  Therefore, there would be 
time for twenty people to speak their minds about one single topic 
 
 71. Id. 
 72. Id. 
 73. Id. 
 74. Id. at 35. 
 75. Cohen, supra note 8, at 381. 
 76. Id. 
 77. Id. 
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within three hours, if real political equality is to be achieved, that is, if 
each person’s voice actually is to be heard. 
Now consider that Occupy Wall Street in Zuccotti Park was far 
more than sixty people—there were closer to six thousand.  The 
number of Working Groups exceeded sixty, moreover, so even within 
the representative structure that was set up, there was never time 
within a three hour meeting to enable actual equal speech on any 
single topic.  Yet the aspiration of doing so requires an intensely rigid 
process, where the number of minutes alloted per person is limited, 
and the scope of topics likewise is limited.  Natural speech patterns 
and thought patterns do not mimic these constraints, so that constant 
reminders of these rules were necessary.  And those who disagreed or 
were tired or annoyed would pick up on the habit of the facilitators to 
recite these patterns, and use technical tools to try to stop certain 
kinds of speech. 
C. Rejection of Representative Decision-Making in Occupy 
Wall Street 
An additional explanation for the legalism that exists within 
Occupy Wall Street might be that the rejection of one model 
(representative decision-making) created a void, meaning that 
another decision-model needed to replace it.  The intuitive response 
of those involved is to mimic a known form, even if the mimicry is not 
actively desired—so when rejecting the form of representative 
decision-making, the community collectively gravitated towards the 
form of decision-making most widely dispersed in our culture, via 
television shows and activists’ own interactions with law, legal rules 
that govern adversarial decision-making. 
Most members of Occupy Wall Street are very interested in 
proving something new, and in creating a new form of self-
governance.  Many occupiers, when asked what they “wanted,” would 
say something along the lines of wanting to demonstrate that it was 
possible to run a community in a different way than other 
communities did.78  They wanted to show that representative 
government might not be necessary by showing that representative 
government was not necessary.79  They were deeply suspicious of 
 
 78. See, e.g., William Greider, The Democratic Promise of Occupy Wall Street, 
THE NATION (Nov. 22, 2011), http://www.thenation.com/article/164767/democratic-
promise-occupy-wall-street#. 
 79. Julia Shaw, Occupy Wall Street Is No Tea Party, THE FOUNDRY (Oct. 26, 
2011, 3:26 PM), http://blog.heritage.org/2011/10/26/occupy-wall-street-is-no-tea-party/ 
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leaders and people with power, and anyone holding persistent power, 
as happens in a representative democracy.  Words like “vote,” and 
“represent” were seen as negative.  Sometimes the reaction was more 
mixed, as when I raised the idea at a structure meeting to look at 
different constitutions: several of the people at the meeting were 
keenly interested in looking at different constitutional structures, 
while others were highly resistant to the comparison to any existing 
governance structure.  Rejection of a norm requires replacement, and 
the court is a very present model for decision-making in American 
culture.  The court, and court system more broadly, are familiar to 
many because of their prevalence in American entertainment 
culture.80  Moreover, the legalistic culture, which started in law 
schools, has spread to the society at large, so that the public rhetoric 
of the mass media as well as individuals often looks to process.  This 
norm is so deeply entrenched in modern culture that part of the 
reason for the legalism could be a kind of “trickle-down” legalism.  
As Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella of the Ontario Court of Appeals 
argued, “We have moved from being a society governed by the rule 
of law to being a society governed by the law of rules.  We have 
become so completely seduced by the notion, borrowed from criminal 
law, that process insures justice, that we have come to believe that 
process is justice.”81  Given this experiment, the question becomes 
whether this is more generalizable, and whether legalism might be a 
likely—if not necessary—side effect of a culture that is committed to 
political equality and consensus. 
At the beginning of this Essay I mentioned that many critics have 
used the language of “bottom up” to describe Occupy Wall Street, 
and associated “bottom up” with “disorganized.”  Scholars on both 
the Left and Right, as well as the popular press, associate devolution 
of law with rejection of law, and oppose devolution and legalism.  
 
(“‘Since we can no longer trust our elected representatives to represent us rather 
than their large donors,’ the Zuccotti Park occupiers explain, ‘we are creating a 
microcosm of what democracy really looks like.’ Zuccotti Park is meant to be a 
model of the governmental structure that should replace America’s constitutional 
system.”) 
80
 Another theory that this Essay does not explore is that the legalistic culture could 
have been a means of entertainment—i.e., the core activity of Occupiers was that 
they needed to be present, and so the “entertainment” of process kept them engaged 
in a way that no other activity could. 
 81. Ben Aisenberg, Are We Losing Our Way?, 27 COLO. LAW. 17, 17 (1998) 
(quoting Justice Rosalie Silberman Abella of the Ontario Court of Appeals at 
American Bar Association midsummer meeting). 
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Some would argue that the more decentralized a legal system is, the 
less law-like it is.82  There are many theorists of a kind of deliberate 
exchange of public reasons and the values that such an exchange 
represents.  Yale Law Professor Bruce Ackerman and his co-
conspirator James Fishkin, the great modern experimenters in 
deliberative democracy, do not give the participants in their 
experiments the kind of ongoing power, and daily contact, that 
epitomized the deliberative discussions of Occupy Wall Street.83  They 
test and imagine situations where “Americans will not be 
encountering each other as consumers or coreligionists or even as 
friends—but as citizens searching for common ground.”84 
I have not found evidence of legalism resulting from their 
experiments, though I suspect that there are a few reasons why.  First, 
they are not testing for it.  Second, many of their experiments rely on 
randomly assigning people to subjects with which they do not initially 
have a deep association.  Third, each person has ample time to speak.  
And fourth, they have no real power and the groups—even if they 
meet multiple times—are meeting in the context of making policy 
decisions that do not directly govern their own lives.85  This arises as 
well in the context of a broad, post-Internet, and Internet-related 
ideology in the culture related to “bottom up” decision-making.  
While the precise description of what constitutes “bottom up” is often 
lacking, the general idea is that permeable structures exist that enable 
anyone with talent, or an idea, or determination, to rise up semi-
 
 82. See Gráinne de Búrca, EU Race Discrimination Law: A Hybrid Model?, in 
LAW AND NEW GOVERNANCE IN THE EU AND THE US 97, 98 (Gráinne de Búrca & 
Joanne Scott eds., 2006) (“The experimentalist governance model on the other hand 
is more radically bottom-up in seeing social actors/stakeholders as generative of 
norms, and responsible for the spread and dispersal of these through their ongoing 
practices and activities.”). 
 83. See generally James S. Fishkin & Robert C. Luskin, Experimenting with a 
Democratic Ideal: Deliberative Polling and Public Opinion, 40 ACTA POLITICA 284 
(2005), available at http://www.uvm.edu/~dguber/POLS234/articles/fishkin.pdf. 
 84. Bruce Ackerman & James S. Fishkin, Deliberation Day, in DEBATING 
DELIBERATIVE DEMOCRACY 7, 22 (James S. Fishkin & Peter Laslett eds., 2003), 
available at http://wxy.seu.edu.cn/humanities/sociology/htmledit/uploadfile/system/ 
20101014/20101014112741352.pdf. 
 85. I find many of these experiments unrealistic, not only because when time and 
power intrude, the dynamic is likely to be very different than a single set of 
interactions.  As a lifelong activist, I have never seen any group work in which the 
bonds of hatred form more quickly than the bonds of friendship.  I find much of the 
deliberate democratic literature to miss out on the emotional nature of community.  
In Occupy Wall Street—a highly engaged, deliberate group—participants became 
highly emotional, highly rational in their argumentation, and almost exclusively 
referred to and imagined a public good when they made their arguments. 
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organically and be recognized and heard, and possibly persuade 
others.  The “bottom up” metaphor suggests a kind of proto-soup, 
where things “bubble up,” and “emerge.”  But the ecosystems that 
allow for “emergent” memes are not necessarily equal, and in fact are 
not likely to be equal.  There’s a romance to the notion of “bottom 
up” governance, or “emergent” governance—the idea that “the 
people” in a mass society can self-govern if they are just given the 
tools or means.86  “Bottom up” or “decentralized” self-governance 
has taken off as a meme in both the Right and the Left—the “new 
governance” mavens of the Right, aligned with the neoliberal 
tradition, talk about devolving power to companies and trade 
associations, while the new governance mavens of the Left (and 
Right) talk about the Internet’s capacity for enabling new forms of 
self-government. 
Occupy Wall Street was created in this rhetorical context, where 
people with different ideas and political beliefs emerge from a 
structure in which “decentralized” and “bottom up” seem both 
plausible, highly romantic, and, while politically charged, 
substantively neutral.  It also arose in the highly legalized context of a 
culture in which entertainment centers around legal dramas and a 
high level of association between process and fairness.  And finally, it 
arose in the context of a rejection of the behavior of major financial 
institutions, which appeared to operate outside of process and outside 
of the rule of law. 
All of these factors—along with the causes mentioned above—may 
have led to a tendency towards legalism.  The experience of Occupy 
Wall Street points to one of the central tensions between 
 
 86. There are at least two discrete “bottom up” ideals that often get conflated in 
the rhetoric of Internet communities.  One is the ideal represented perhaps best by 
Jonathan Zittrain, who characterizes the Internet as a generative place, a platform 
that enables creativity. See generally Jonathan Zittrain, The Generative Internet, 119 
HARV. L. REV. 1974 (2006).  In this model, the Internet isn’t democratic and its job 
isn’t to be democratic—its job is to not hinder creativity, collaboration, and 
interesting ideas and creations.  The other ideal, exemplified by David Post, among 
others, is that the Internet is actually democratic, that it leads to a better expression 
of the popular will in a fundamental way, even as it encourages democratic virtues of 
citizenship, personal political expression, and organizing. See generally David G. 
Post, IN SEARCH OF JEFFERSON’S MOOSE: NOTES ON THE STATE OF CYBERSPACE 
(2009).  In crude form, Zittrain is bottom-up innovation; Post is bottom-up 
democracy.  A highly innovative society can be very non-self-governing, and a highly 
self-governing society can be terribly uncreative—so while it might seem that they 
write about the same thing, Zittrain and Post try to solve—and forestall—two very 
different kinds of problems.  Yet in popular culture, and in some academic thinking, 
the two ideas can be fused. 
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decentralization of power, and democratization of power, and a 
culture with an ends-focus instead of a means-focus.  The most central 
commitments of Habermas are quite similar to the central 
commitments of Occupy Wall Street.  The rigorous focus on political 
equality at the level of process turned the discussions into those of 
process.  While people had formal equality to speak, they tended to 
speak on behalf of sets of beliefs about the public as a whole, and the 
community as a whole, not as individuals—yet the process quickly 
showed itself to be cripplingly uninspired and focused on process.  
CONCLUSION 
Occupy Wall Street is an extremely important social movement to 
understand.  It sparked—at least for a little while—a change in the 
structure of American political thought.  It created an imaginative 
opening in the political and economic possibilities for the country by 
giving a name to a set of ideological and political commitments, and a 
particular set of grievances, that did not previously have a name or a 
label.  It transformed a loose set of ideological commitments into an 
ideological set that now has become part of the public grammar.  The 
set of ideological challenges to orthodox political and economic 
thinking that are loosely represented by “Occupy Wall Street” pre-
dated Occupy Wall Street but had less power before they were 
recognized as a cluster and called a “movement.”87  Therefore, it is 
 
 87. The public acceptance of an imagined set of ideas as a “real movement” can 
give actual power to the ideas associated with that movement.  The acceptance of this 
set of ideas in the public imagination has a power beyond the power of polling 
numbers.  There is a substantial difference—in terms of power—between the 
statement “60% of Americans believe that abortion is wrong” and a repeated 
reference to the “pro-life movement supported by 60% of Americans.”  This is in 
part attributable to the actual power that accompanies some groupings, including 
organizational and financial power to directly impact elections. 
However, it is also attributable to the fact that politicians and political actors have an 
unstated map of the shape of American political life in their head, and they are more 
likely to be afraid of, excited by, and generally responsive to a set of ideas that are 
attached to a general description.  The set of ideological commitments that are 
loosely represented by “the Tea Party” pre-existed the Tea Party’s rallies and local 
meetings, but gained enormous power once they were clustered under the heading of 
“the Tea Party.”  To think of it another way, there is an imagined American political 
culture and an actual American political culture that relates to the imagined culture 
and helps shape it but is not identical to it.  There are different ways of describing the 
culture and categories of belief, allegiance, and partisanship associated with loosely 
imagined groups within that culture.  The imagined map of a political culture as 
experienced by the media, citizens, and politicians itself shapes that culture and that 
map moves in a way that is slightly different than direct polling.  Occupy Wall Street 
changed that map. 
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also important to understand some of the things that seemed to work 
poorly at Occupy Wall Street for sustaining ongoing action.  
To my mind, the consensus process may have worked extremely 
well for a few months, because it brought people together, created a 
shared language, provided entertainment for protesters whose 
primary job was to be present, hour after hour, day after day, in the 
center of Wall Street, and provided some means of making decisions.  
However, over time, the consensus process not only stopped 
decisions, but also led to a kind of fetishizing of “the process,” and led 
away from action towards legalism.  The experiment may show some 
of the limits of formal political equality.  I wonder whether, at some 
point, formal legal equality must give way to a more organic 
discussion (which will necessarily be more hierarchical) in order to 
avoid the pitfalls of legalism.  When people in a real setting “regard 
one another as formally and substantively equal,” it can easily 
become an exercise in rulemaking to ensure that each person gets the 
political equality that is demanded.  And in those situations where the 
rules exist, and the norm is very high, it is very easy to make a jump 
from substantive to procedural debate.  Once inside procedural 
debates, those procedural debates may have a tendency to dominate.  
If the idea of radical political equality is taken seriously, it may be 
that “bottom up” and legalism are more joined than “bottom up” and 
anarchism.  The implicit narratives and metaphors of “bubbling up” 
(bubbling up sounding disorganized), or “grassroots” (grass sounding 
disorganized), or “movement” (sounding like flow more than order), 
may consistently reinforce a misleading narrative about the nature of 
certain kinds of political organizing. 
